【原標(biāo)題：LED反中國言論：為了罵中國不帶臟字 安全意識亟待提升】財(cái)金網(wǎng)消息 “銳實(shí)力”，披著學(xué)術(shù)外衣的罵人話

網(wǎng)站在轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)該文時(shí)，用的標(biāo)題是“為了罵中國不帶臟字，西方又發(fā)明一個(gè)新詞!”。該社評原文如下：

腦子都用這兒了!

西方給中俄編了個(gè)“銳實(shí)力”概念，近來逐漸流行開來。當(dāng)它被用在中國頭上時(shí)，主要是指中國的對外文化交流受政府控制，并且有對西方國家進(jìn)行價(jià)值觀滲透、干預(yù)文化領(lǐng)域各種自由的政治目的。

英國《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》不久前用封面文章描述中國的“銳實(shí)力”，美國《外交事務(wù)》雜志新近刊登的約瑟夫·奈文章重點(diǎn)探討了如何用軟實(shí)力對抗中俄的“銳實(shí)力”。

西方戰(zhàn)略界善于炮制各種概念，但“銳實(shí)力”這個(gè)詞的價(jià)值判斷過于明顯。它從一走上西方媒體，就被用來描述中俄的行為，說不好聽的，它就是加在硬實(shí)力和軟實(shí)力中間的披著學(xué)術(shù)外衣的罵人話。

做同樣的事，美國和西方是展現(xiàn)軟實(shí)力，中俄則是使用銳實(shí)力。比如美國的基金會在中國資助學(xué)術(shù)研究，是軟實(shí)力。中國香港的中美交流基金會資助得州大學(xué)奧斯汀分校，就成了銳實(shí)力。在中國有德國的歌德學(xué)院，西班牙的塞萬提斯學(xué)院，它們都是軟實(shí)力，中國在世界各地辦的孔子學(xué)院，就被約瑟夫·奈貼上“銳實(shí)力”標(biāo)簽。

中國有意愿通過“滲透”改變美國和西方社會的價(jià)值觀，影響那里的學(xué)術(shù)及言論自由嗎?全體中國人都會覺得這個(gè)問題有點(diǎn)莫名其妙，因?yàn)檫@既超出了中國的能力，也不符合中國對外交流的基本理念。

如果說中國想在對外文化交流中產(chǎn)生什么影響，它的唯一指向就是促使那個(gè)國家的對華態(tài)度更友好些。給西方國家的社會治理打上一些中國的烙印，意識形態(tài)領(lǐng)域發(fā)生一些價(jià)值上的變異，不能不說中國人連想都沒想過，是一些西方人的腦瓜轉(zhuǎn)得太快了，我們的感覺是有點(diǎn)跟不上。

西方輿論這一輪對中國“銳實(shí)力”的指責(zé)和炒作給了我們一個(gè)感慨：西方真的不自信了。這個(gè)概念的提出也許意味著西方對華全面攻勢向守勢過渡的開始。

總結(jié)最近一些年的變化，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，西方的對華影響力在不斷衰減，中國社會的集體自信持續(xù)上升。西方價(jià)值觀驕傲地在中國到處插小旗子的時(shí)代已近黃昏，中國經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力在西方的擴(kuò)散讓一些人擔(dān)心會出現(xiàn)一個(gè)不一樣的黎明。

首先，西方人權(quán)觀念在中國的傳播已經(jīng)進(jìn)入死胡同，變成與極少數(shù)異見人士和民族分裂分子搞到一起，完全脫離了中國廣大民眾的訴求。以至于西方一對中國談人權(quán)，中國公眾比官員還反感，大家都覺得這是西方在找中國的麻煩。

人權(quán)是西方影響中國社會的核心觀念之一，人權(quán)攻勢的瓦解拉黑、調(diào)暗了西方其他軟實(shí)力的魅力。中國人的人文自信迅速回升，中西之間開始邁入新的思想平等時(shí)代，這是幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來不曾有過的。

其實(shí)硬實(shí)力、軟實(shí)力的劃分是西方對自身情況的總結(jié)，中國與西方的基本國情本就有很大不同，這決定了中國力量的組成形態(tài)和使用邏輯也都有別于西方。中西交流需要全面相互適應(yīng)，而不是以西方利益為中心，套用西方的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，對中西交流評頭論足，并將這些評價(jià)偽裝成國際社會的態(tài)度。

有一點(diǎn)很重要，西方已經(jīng)指揮不了世界的大腦，無論西方說什么，只要中國方面堅(jiān)持自己的原則和立場，不以西方的話語邏輯為基礎(chǔ)與之互動，他們那些人的鼓噪就轉(zhuǎn)化不成某種現(xiàn)實(shí)推力。西方的很多人大概隱約感到了這一點(diǎn)，這增加了他們的焦慮，也使他們對中國有可能反過來“滲透西方”而憂心忡忡。

環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)這篇駁斥“銳實(shí)力”(Sharp power)的社評，一如既往地銳利，而且在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的傳播效果也一如既往地銳不可當(dāng)，獲得網(wǎng)民點(diǎn)贊無數(shù)。

話說這個(gè)銳字，似乎并不是貶義詞，至少在漢語中如此;在西語中也最多不過是個(gè)中性詞。比如銳不可當(dāng)、銳意進(jìn)取、披堅(jiān)執(zhí)銳、養(yǎng)精蓄銳……都是非常正能量的勵(lì)志好詞。

但是為什么環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)今天要批這個(gè)Sharp power呢?為什么它要說“銳實(shí)力”是一個(gè)罵人不帶臟字的壞詞呢?

有好事者把《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》12月16日那篇頭條文章《Sharp power》翻譯成了中文，那就來看看它究竟是什么貨色吧——讀完你就知道環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)為什么要發(fā)這篇社評了。

銳實(shí)力

——中國正在操縱西方民主國家的言論。中國人要做什么?

當(dāng)一個(gè)崛起中的大國挑戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)有的超級大國，戰(zhàn)爭常常會隨之到來。希臘歷史學(xué)家首次描述了這種可能出現(xiàn)的情況，并把它稱作“修昔底德陷阱”。修昔底德陷阱又再次令人擔(dān)憂地出現(xiàn)在中國和西方的關(guān)系中，尤其是中美關(guān)系。如今，兩強(qiáng)之間潛在的沖突對抗不斷升級。即使中國不尋求征服外國的土地，但許多人也很害怕，它會尋求征服外國人的人心。

澳大利亞首當(dāng)其沖。對于中國的這種策略，澳大利亞已經(jīng)發(fā)出了警報(bào)。12月5號，中國正在干涉澳大利亞的政治、大學(xué)和出版業(yè)的指控已經(jīng)讓澳大利亞政府制定出新法律，去處理那些“前所未有而且越發(fā)老練”的，試圖影響本國立法委員的外國勢力。本周，一個(gè)澳大利亞參議員辭職了。因?yàn)樗恢缚厥樟酥袊腻X，然后站在反政府的立場上為中國說話。英國、加拿大和新西蘭也接連開始拉響警報(bào)。12月10號，德國指控中國試圖在培養(yǎng)親中的政治家和官員。12月13號，(德國)國會舉行了討論中國不斷增長的影響力的聽證會。

這一系列行為有一個(gè)名字，叫“銳實(shí)力”。“銳實(shí)力”這個(gè)詞是由華盛頓的智庫，國家民主基金會(National Endowment for Democracy)所創(chuàng)造的。“軟實(shí)力”利用文化和價(jià)值觀的誘導(dǎo)，來強(qiáng)化一個(gè)國家的實(shí)力，而銳實(shí)力幫助威權(quán)政權(quán)綁架和操縱國外的觀點(diǎn)。

西方需要對中國的行為作出回應(yīng)，但是不能簡單地對中國豎起高墻。中國不像以前的蘇聯(lián)，它是世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的一部分。與深溝壁壘相反，在這個(gè)政治家極度短缺的時(shí)代，西方需要找尋一個(gè)有政治風(fēng)度的中立立場。而這應(yīng)開始于了解銳實(shí)力以及它是怎么發(fā)揮作用的。

影響有影響力的人(Influence the influencer)

像很多國家一樣，中國長期以來試圖用簽證、金援、投資和文化來追求自身利益。但是它最近的行動越發(fā)顯得有脅迫性而且無處不在。它的銳實(shí)力有一系列環(huán)環(huán)相扣的組成部分：顛覆政府、霸凌小國和施加壓力。這三者又組合在一起來促使“自我審查”。對中國來說，終極大獎(jiǎng)是先發(fā)制人地接受那些它影響力還未能及，不過害怕失去中國的金援、管道和影響的國家的跪拜。中國在歷史上長期監(jiān)視著其在海外的華人，不過顛覆(外國政府)的行動已經(jīng)鋪開。據(jù)稱，在澳大利亞和新西蘭，中國的鈔票借著給政黨或者單個(gè)政治家獻(xiàn)金的名義，早已買下了(當(dāng)?shù)?政界的影響力。本周，德國情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)抱怨稱：中國利用領(lǐng)英的商業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，搞一些人來偽裝成招聘者或智庫學(xué)者，還提供免費(fèi)的旅行來誘捕(他國)政治家或政府官員。

中國的霸凌也換了新套路。有時(shí)候釋出的信號是很露骨的，比如中國因諾貝爾和平獎(jiǎng)?lì)C給了一位中國民運(yùn)人士而從經(jīng)濟(jì)上懲罰挪威。不過更常見的是，比如說，對中國的批評并不會在新聞發(fā)布會上讓發(fā)言人直白表達(dá)，又或者學(xué)術(shù)討論避開研究那些中國視為敏感的話題。個(gè)體遭受打壓的例子看起來很渺小，(中共)官員在其中扮演的角色也很難度量。不過(惹到中共)后果常常十分嚴(yán)重：西方的許多教授不得不在壓力下宣布放棄(研究敏感話題);外國研究者可能會再也沒法看到中國的檔案資料;政策制定者也許會發(fā)現(xiàn)中國本土專家因?yàn)樘狈Ρ匾男畔⒍鵁o法幫助他們。

中國已經(jīng)如此地融入世界經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治和文化生活，西方不得不面對這種壓力。西方政府也許會更加珍視貿(mào)易而忽視在外交的上得分，比如希臘在一間中國公司剛投資比雷埃夫斯港口后，對歐盟一份批判中國人權(quán)記錄的聲明動用了否決權(quán)。經(jīng)濟(jì)問題是如此之重要，以至于無須中國多言，商業(yè)就常常隨著中國的節(jié)拍起舞。一家澳大利亞出版社最近突然收回出版一本引用了對“北京的超級特工(agents of influence)”的恐懼的書。

(注：超級特工Anagent of influenceis an agent of some stature who uses his or her position to influencepublic opinion or decision making to produce results beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates the agent.)

該怎么辦?

面對來自澳大利亞和德國的抱怨，中國稱這些批評是不負(fù)責(zé)任的而且是偏執(zhí)的，實(shí)際上是非常危險(xiǎn)的反華臆想。然而，如果中國誠實(shí)的話，它會指出這僅僅是國家變得強(qiáng)大之時(shí)，對影響力的渴望而已。

中國在它的國界外比過去面臨更多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。從1978年起，大約一千萬中國人已經(jīng)移居國外。中國當(dāng)局擔(dān)心他們會從外國人那里染上民主的毛病然后傳染回中國。分別地(Separately)，中國的公司正在富裕國家投資，投資領(lǐng)域包括(自然)資源、戰(zhàn)略性基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和農(nóng)地。中國的海軍已經(jīng)能在海外遠(yuǎn)距離地投射力量。中國政府老是苦惱它在國外的壞印象會有不好的影響。作為崛起中的超級大國，中國有很大的胃口要去重塑全球參與秩序——目前的秩序大都是由美國和西歐國家制定的，而且總是被他們拿來援引，去證明他們自己的行為的正當(dāng)性。

為了確保中國的崛起是和平的，西方需要為中國的雄心讓出空間。但這不意味著一切都讓中國為所欲為。開放的社會忽視中國的銳實(shí)力會很危險(xiǎn)。他們的防范措施應(yīng)該切實(shí)一點(diǎn)。反情報(bào)行動、法律和獨(dú)立媒體是應(yīng)對顛覆活動的最好保護(hù)。這三者需要有抓住政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系的中國發(fā)言人。中共長期以來壓迫自由言論、公開辯論和獨(dú)立思考，以此鞏固自己的控制。僅是讓它的銳實(shí)力策略為世人所知并且讓那些跪拜磕頭的國家感到羞恥，借此來削弱他們的(銳實(shí)力)，還有很長的路要走。

一方面，(西方)應(yīng)該有原則。發(fā)起對中國人民的政治迫害是錯(cuò)誤的;這也會讓西方對法律與規(guī)則的堅(jiān)持變得空洞。來自美國政治家采取以牙還牙，“互惠”措施的呼吁，可以說是公平的自我防衛(wèi)，比如對學(xué)者和非政府組織工作者采取(與中國)對等的簽證(政策)。仍然忽視這些(政治)操縱，期望中國在未來變得更友善，只會迎來變本加厲的行為。與此相反(Instead)，西方需要堅(jiān)守自身的原則。如果可能，就各國合作;如果必要，就分開行動。對西方來說，避開修昔底德陷阱的第一步就是要利用自身的價(jià)值觀來讓中國的銳實(shí)力變“鈍”。

附原文：

Sharp power

——China is manipulating debate in Western democracies. What can they do about it?

WHEN a risig power challenges an incumbent one, war often follows. That prospect, known as the Thucydides trap after the Greek historian who first described it, looms over relations between China and the West, particularly America. So, increasingly, does a more insidious confrontation. Even if China does not seek to conquer foreign lands, many people fear that it seeks to conquer foreign minds.

Australia was the first to raise a red flag about China’s tactics. On December 5th allegations that China has been interfering in Australian politics, universities and publishing led the government to propose new laws to tackle “unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated” foreign efforts to influence lawmakers . This week an Australian senator resigned over accusations that, as an opposition spokesman, he took money from China and argued its corner. Britain, Canada and New Zealand are also beginning to raise the alarm. On December 10th Germany accused China of trying to groom politicians and bureaucrats. And on December 13th Congress held hearings on China’s growing influence.

This behaviour has a name—“sharp power”, coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington-based think-tank. “Soft power” harnesses the allure of culture and values to add to a country’s strength; sharp power helps authoritarian regimes coerce and manipulate opinion abroad.

The West needs to respond to China’s behaviour, but it can not simply throw up the barricades. Unlike the old Soviet Un- ion, China is part of the world economy. Instead, in an era when statesmanship is in short supply, the West needs to find a statesmanlike middle ground. That starts with an understanding of sharp power and how it works.

Influencing the influencers

Like many countries, China has long tried to use visas, grants, investments and culture to pursue its interests. But its actions have recently grown more intimidating and encompassing. Its sharp power has a series of interlocking components: subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self- censorship. For China, the ultimate prize is pre-emptive kowtowing by those whom it has not approached, but who nonetheless fear losing funding, access or influence.

China has a history of spying on its diaspora, but the subversion has spread. In Australia and New Zealand Chinese money is alleged to have bought influence in politics, with party donations or payments to individual politicians. This week’s complaint from German intelligence said that China was using the LinkedIn business network to ensnare politicians and government officials, by having people posing as recruiters and think-tankers and offering free trips.

Bullying has also taken on a new menace. Sometimes the message is blatant, as when China punished Norway economically for awarding a Nobel peace prize to a Chinese pro- democracy activist. More often, as when critics of China are not included in speaker line-ups at conferences, or academics avoid study of topics that China deems sensitive, individual cases seem small and the role of officials is hard to prove. But the effect can be grave. Western professors have been pressed to recant. Foreign researchers may lose access to Chinese archives. Policymakers may find that China experts in their own countries are too ill-informed to help them.

Because China is so integrated into economic, political and cultural life, the West is vulnerable to such pressure. Western governments may value trade over scoring diplomatic points, as when Greece vetoed a European Union statement criticising China’s record on human rights, shortly after a Chinese firm had invested in the port of Piraeus. The economy is so big that businesses often dance to China’s tune without being told to. An Australian publisher suddenly pulled a book, citing fears of “Beijing’s agents of influence”.

What to do?

Facing complaints from Australia and Germany, China has called its critics irresponsible and paranoid—and there is indeed a danger of anti-Chinese hysteria. However, if China were being more truthful, it would point out that its desire for influence is what happens when countries become powerful.

China has a lot more at stake outside its borders today than it did. Some 10m Chinese have moved abroad since 1978. It worries that they will pick up democratic habits from foreigners and infect China itself. Separately, Chinese companies are investing in rich countries, including in resources, strategic infrastructure and farmland. China’s navy can project power far from home. Its government frets that its poor image abroad will do it harm. And as the rising superpower, China has an appetite to shape the rules of global engagement—rules created largely by America and western Europe and routinely invoked by them to justify their own actions.

To ensure China’s rise is peaceful, the West needs to make room for China’s ambition. But that does not mean anything goes. Open societies ignore China’s sharp power at their peril.

Part of their defence should be practical. Counter-intelligence, the law and an independent media are the best protection against subversion. All three need Chinese speakers who grasp the connection between politics and commerce in China.C$h$i$n$e$s$e C$o$m$m$u$n$i$s$t P$a$r$t$y sup$presses fr$ee ex$pression, o$pen de$bate and in$dependent th$ought to ce$ment its control.Part should be principled. Unleashing a witch-hunt against Chinese people would be wrong; it would also make Western claims to stand for the rule of law sound hollow. Calls from American politicians for tit-for-tat “reciprocity”, over visas for academics and NGO workers, say, would be equally self-defeating. Yet ignoring manipulation in the hope that China will be more friendly in the future would only invite the next jab. Instead the West needs to stand by its own principles, with countries acting together if possible, and separately if they must. The first step in avoiding the Thucydides trap is for the West to use its own values to blunt China’s sharp power.