【原標(biāo)題：LED反中國(guó)言論：為了罵中國(guó)不帶臟字 安全意識(shí)亟待提升】財(cái)金網(wǎng)消息 “銳實(shí)力”，披著學(xué)術(shù)外衣的罵人話

網(wǎng)站在轉(zhuǎn)發(fā)該文時(shí)，用的標(biāo)題是“為了罵中國(guó)不帶臟字，西方又發(fā)明一個(gè)新詞!”。該社評(píng)原文如下：

腦子都用這兒了!

西方給中俄編了個(gè)“銳實(shí)力”概念，近來(lái)逐漸流行開(kāi)來(lái)。當(dāng)它被用在中國(guó)頭上時(shí)，主要是指中國(guó)的對(duì)外文化交流受政府控制，并且有對(duì)西方國(guó)家進(jìn)行價(jià)值觀滲透、干預(yù)文化領(lǐng)域各種自由的政治目的。

英國(guó)《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》不久前用封面文章描述中國(guó)的“銳實(shí)力”，美國(guó)《外交事務(wù)》雜志新近刊登的約瑟夫·奈文章重點(diǎn)探討了如何用軟實(shí)力對(duì)抗中俄的“銳實(shí)力”。

西方戰(zhàn)略界善于炮制各種概念，但“銳實(shí)力”這個(gè)詞的價(jià)值判斷過(guò)于明顯。它從一走上西方媒體，就被用來(lái)描述中俄的行為，說(shuō)不好聽(tīng)的，它就是加在硬實(shí)力和軟實(shí)力中間的披著學(xué)術(shù)外衣的罵人話。

做同樣的事，美國(guó)和西方是展現(xiàn)軟實(shí)力，中俄則是使用銳實(shí)力。比如美國(guó)的基金會(huì)在中國(guó)資助學(xué)術(shù)研究，是軟實(shí)力。中國(guó)香港的中美交流基金會(huì)資助得州大學(xué)奧斯汀分校，就成了銳實(shí)力。在中國(guó)有德國(guó)的歌德學(xué)院，西班牙的塞萬(wàn)提斯學(xué)院，它們都是軟實(shí)力，中國(guó)在世界各地辦的孔子學(xué)院，就被約瑟夫·奈貼上“銳實(shí)力”標(biāo)簽。

中國(guó)有意愿通過(guò)“滲透”改變美國(guó)和西方社會(huì)的價(jià)值觀，影響那里的學(xué)術(shù)及言論自由嗎?全體中國(guó)人都會(huì)覺(jué)得這個(gè)問(wèn)題有點(diǎn)莫名其妙，因?yàn)檫@既超出了中國(guó)的能力，也不符合中國(guó)對(duì)外交流的基本理念。

如果說(shuō)中國(guó)想在對(duì)外文化交流中產(chǎn)生什么影響，它的唯一指向就是促使那個(gè)國(guó)家的對(duì)華態(tài)度更友好些。給西方國(guó)家的社會(huì)治理打上一些中國(guó)的烙印，意識(shí)形態(tài)領(lǐng)域發(fā)生一些價(jià)值上的變異，不能不說(shuō)中國(guó)人連想都沒(méi)想過(guò)，是一些西方人的腦瓜轉(zhuǎn)得太快了，我們的感覺(jué)是有點(diǎn)跟不上。

西方輿論這一輪對(duì)中國(guó)“銳實(shí)力”的指責(zé)和炒作給了我們一個(gè)感慨：西方真的不自信了。這個(gè)概念的提出也許意味著西方對(duì)華全面攻勢(shì)向守勢(shì)過(guò)渡的開(kāi)始。

總結(jié)最近一些年的變化，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，西方的對(duì)華影響力在不斷衰減，中國(guó)社會(huì)的集體自信持續(xù)上升。西方價(jià)值觀驕傲地在中國(guó)到處插小旗子的時(shí)代已近黃昏，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力在西方的擴(kuò)散讓一些人擔(dān)心會(huì)出現(xiàn)一個(gè)不一樣的黎明。

首先，西方人權(quán)觀念在中國(guó)的傳播已經(jīng)進(jìn)入死胡同，變成與極少數(shù)異見(jiàn)人士和民族分裂分子搞到一起，完全脫離了中國(guó)廣大民眾的訴求。以至于西方一對(duì)中國(guó)談人權(quán)，中國(guó)公眾比官員還反感，大家都覺(jué)得這是西方在找中國(guó)的麻煩。

人權(quán)是西方影響中國(guó)社會(huì)的核心觀念之一，人權(quán)攻勢(shì)的瓦解拉黑、調(diào)暗了西方其他軟實(shí)力的魅力。中國(guó)人的人文自信迅速回升，中西之間開(kāi)始邁入新的思想平等時(shí)代，這是幾個(gè)世紀(jì)以來(lái)不曾有過(guò)的。

其實(shí)硬實(shí)力、軟實(shí)力的劃分是西方對(duì)自身情況的總結(jié)，中國(guó)與西方的基本國(guó)情本就有很大不同，這決定了中國(guó)力量的組成形態(tài)和使用邏輯也都有別于西方。中西交流需要全面相互適應(yīng)，而不是以西方利益為中心，套用西方的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，對(duì)中西交流評(píng)頭論足，并將這些評(píng)價(jià)偽裝成國(guó)際社會(huì)的態(tài)度。

有一點(diǎn)很重要，西方已經(jīng)指揮不了世界的大腦，無(wú)論西方說(shuō)什么，只要中國(guó)方面堅(jiān)持自己的原則和立場(chǎng)，不以西方的話語(yǔ)邏輯為基礎(chǔ)與之互動(dòng)，他們那些人的鼓噪就轉(zhuǎn)化不成某種現(xiàn)實(shí)推力。西方的很多人大概隱約感到了這一點(diǎn)，這增加了他們的焦慮，也使他們對(duì)中國(guó)有可能反過(guò)來(lái)“滲透西方”而憂心忡忡。

環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)這篇駁斥“銳實(shí)力”(Sharp power)的社評(píng)，一如既往地銳利，而且在網(wǎng)絡(luò)上的傳播效果也一如既往地銳不可當(dāng)，獲得網(wǎng)民點(diǎn)贊無(wú)數(shù)。

話說(shuō)這個(gè)銳字，似乎并不是貶義詞，至少在漢語(yǔ)中如此;在西語(yǔ)中也最多不過(guò)是個(gè)中性詞。比如銳不可當(dāng)、銳意進(jìn)取、披堅(jiān)執(zhí)銳、養(yǎng)精蓄銳……都是非常正能量的勵(lì)志好詞。

但是為什么環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)今天要批這個(gè)Sharp power呢?為什么它要說(shuō)“銳實(shí)力”是一個(gè)罵人不帶臟字的壞詞呢?

有好事者把《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》12月16日那篇頭條文章《Sharp power》翻譯成了中文，那就來(lái)看看它究竟是什么貨色吧——讀完你就知道環(huán)球時(shí)報(bào)為什么要發(fā)這篇社評(píng)了。

銳實(shí)力

——中國(guó)正在操縱西方民主國(guó)家的言論。中國(guó)人要做什么?

當(dāng)一個(gè)崛起中的大國(guó)挑戰(zhàn)現(xiàn)有的超級(jí)大國(guó)，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)常常會(huì)隨之到來(lái)。希臘歷史學(xué)家首次描述了這種可能出現(xiàn)的情況，并把它稱作“修昔底德陷阱”。修昔底德陷阱又再次令人擔(dān)憂地出現(xiàn)在中國(guó)和西方的關(guān)系中，尤其是中美關(guān)系。如今，兩強(qiáng)之間潛在的沖突對(duì)抗不斷升級(jí)。即使中國(guó)不尋求征服外國(guó)的土地，但許多人也很害怕，它會(huì)尋求征服外國(guó)人的人心。

澳大利亞首當(dāng)其沖。對(duì)于中國(guó)的這種策略，澳大利亞已經(jīng)發(fā)出了警報(bào)。12月5號(hào)，中國(guó)正在干涉澳大利亞的政治、大學(xué)和出版業(yè)的指控已經(jīng)讓澳大利亞政府制定出新法律，去處理那些“前所未有而且越發(fā)老練”的，試圖影響本國(guó)立法委員的外國(guó)勢(shì)力。本周，一個(gè)澳大利亞參議員辭職了。因?yàn)樗恢缚厥樟酥袊?guó)的錢(qián)，然后站在反政府的立場(chǎng)上為中國(guó)說(shuō)話。英國(guó)、加拿大和新西蘭也接連開(kāi)始拉響警報(bào)。12月10號(hào)，德國(guó)指控中國(guó)試圖在培養(yǎng)親中的政治家和官員。12月13號(hào)，(德國(guó))國(guó)會(huì)舉行了討論中國(guó)不斷增長(zhǎng)的影響力的聽(tīng)證會(huì)。

這一系列行為有一個(gè)名字，叫“銳實(shí)力”。“銳實(shí)力”這個(gè)詞是由華盛頓的智庫(kù)，國(guó)家民主基金會(huì)(National Endowment for Democracy)所創(chuàng)造的。“軟實(shí)力”利用文化和價(jià)值觀的誘導(dǎo)，來(lái)強(qiáng)化一個(gè)國(guó)家的實(shí)力，而銳實(shí)力幫助威權(quán)政權(quán)綁架和操縱國(guó)外的觀點(diǎn)。

西方需要對(duì)中國(guó)的行為作出回應(yīng)，但是不能簡(jiǎn)單地對(duì)中國(guó)豎起高墻。中國(guó)不像以前的蘇聯(lián)，它是世界經(jīng)濟(jì)的一部分。與深溝壁壘相反，在這個(gè)政治家極度短缺的時(shí)代，西方需要找尋一個(gè)有政治風(fēng)度的中立立場(chǎng)。而這應(yīng)開(kāi)始于了解銳實(shí)力以及它是怎么發(fā)揮作用的。

影響有影響力的人(Influence the influencer)

像很多國(guó)家一樣，中國(guó)長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)試圖用簽證、金援、投資和文化來(lái)追求自身利益。但是它最近的行動(dòng)越發(fā)顯得有脅迫性而且無(wú)處不在。它的銳實(shí)力有一系列環(huán)環(huán)相扣的組成部分：顛覆政府、霸凌小國(guó)和施加壓力。這三者又組合在一起來(lái)促使“自我審查”。對(duì)中國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)，終極大獎(jiǎng)是先發(fā)制人地接受那些它影響力還未能及，不過(guò)害怕失去中國(guó)的金援、管道和影響的國(guó)家的跪拜。中國(guó)在歷史上長(zhǎng)期監(jiān)視著其在海外的華人，不過(guò)顛覆(外國(guó)政府)的行動(dòng)已經(jīng)鋪開(kāi)。據(jù)稱，在澳大利亞和新西蘭，中國(guó)的鈔票借著給政黨或者單個(gè)政治家獻(xiàn)金的名義，早已買(mǎi)下了(當(dāng)?shù)?政界的影響力。本周，德國(guó)情報(bào)機(jī)構(gòu)抱怨稱：中國(guó)利用領(lǐng)英的商業(yè)網(wǎng)絡(luò)，搞一些人來(lái)偽裝成招聘者或智庫(kù)學(xué)者，還提供免費(fèi)的旅行來(lái)誘捕(他國(guó))政治家或政府官員。

中國(guó)的霸凌也換了新套路。有時(shí)候釋出的信號(hào)是很露骨的，比如中國(guó)因諾貝爾和平獎(jiǎng)?lì)C給了一位中國(guó)民運(yùn)人士而從經(jīng)濟(jì)上懲罰挪威。不過(guò)更常見(jiàn)的是，比如說(shuō)，對(duì)中國(guó)的批評(píng)并不會(huì)在新聞發(fā)布會(huì)上讓發(fā)言人直白表達(dá)，又或者學(xué)術(shù)討論避開(kāi)研究那些中國(guó)視為敏感的話題。個(gè)體遭受打壓的例子看起來(lái)很渺小，(中共)官員在其中扮演的角色也很難度量。不過(guò)(惹到中共)后果常常十分嚴(yán)重：西方的許多教授不得不在壓力下宣布放棄(研究敏感話題);外國(guó)研究者可能會(huì)再也沒(méi)法看到中國(guó)的檔案資料;政策制定者也許會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)中國(guó)本土專家因?yàn)樘狈Ρ匾男畔⒍鵁o(wú)法幫助他們。

中國(guó)已經(jīng)如此地融入世界經(jīng)濟(jì)、政治和文化生活，西方不得不面對(duì)這種壓力。西方政府也許會(huì)更加珍視貿(mào)易而忽視在外交的上得分，比如希臘在一間中國(guó)公司剛投資比雷埃夫斯港口后，對(duì)歐盟一份批判中國(guó)人權(quán)記錄的聲明動(dòng)用了否決權(quán)。經(jīng)濟(jì)問(wèn)題是如此之重要，以至于無(wú)須中國(guó)多言，商業(yè)就常常隨著中國(guó)的節(jié)拍起舞。一家澳大利亞出版社最近突然收回出版一本引用了對(duì)“北京的超級(jí)特工(agents of influence)”的恐懼的書(shū)。

(注：超級(jí)特工Anagent of influenceis an agent of some stature who uses his or her position to influencepublic opinion or decision making to produce results beneficial to the country whose intelligence service operates the agent.)

該怎么辦?

面對(duì)來(lái)自澳大利亞和德國(guó)的抱怨，中國(guó)稱這些批評(píng)是不負(fù)責(zé)任的而且是偏執(zhí)的，實(shí)際上是非常危險(xiǎn)的反華臆想。然而，如果中國(guó)誠(chéng)實(shí)的話，它會(huì)指出這僅僅是國(guó)家變得強(qiáng)大之時(shí)，對(duì)影響力的渴望而已。

中國(guó)在它的國(guó)界外比過(guò)去面臨更多的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。從1978年起，大約一千萬(wàn)中國(guó)人已經(jīng)移居國(guó)外。中國(guó)當(dāng)局擔(dān)心他們會(huì)從外國(guó)人那里染上民主的毛病然后傳染回中國(guó)。分別地(Separately)，中國(guó)的公司正在富裕國(guó)家投資，投資領(lǐng)域包括(自然)資源、戰(zhàn)略性基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施和農(nóng)地。中國(guó)的海軍已經(jīng)能在海外遠(yuǎn)距離地投射力量。中國(guó)政府老是苦惱它在國(guó)外的壞印象會(huì)有不好的影響。作為崛起中的超級(jí)大國(guó)，中國(guó)有很大的胃口要去重塑全球參與秩序——目前的秩序大都是由美國(guó)和西歐國(guó)家制定的，而且總是被他們拿來(lái)援引，去證明他們自己的行為的正當(dāng)性。

為了確保中國(guó)的崛起是和平的，西方需要為中國(guó)的雄心讓出空間。但這不意味著一切都讓中國(guó)為所欲為。開(kāi)放的社會(huì)忽視中國(guó)的銳實(shí)力會(huì)很危險(xiǎn)。他們的防范措施應(yīng)該切實(shí)一點(diǎn)。反情報(bào)行動(dòng)、法律和獨(dú)立媒體是應(yīng)對(duì)顛覆活動(dòng)的最好保護(hù)。這三者需要有抓住政治和經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)系的中國(guó)發(fā)言人。中共長(zhǎng)期以來(lái)壓迫自由言論、公開(kāi)辯論和獨(dú)立思考，以此鞏固自己的控制。僅是讓它的銳實(shí)力策略為世人所知并且讓那些跪拜磕頭的國(guó)家感到羞恥，借此來(lái)削弱他們的(銳實(shí)力)，還有很長(zhǎng)的路要走。

一方面，(西方)應(yīng)該有原則。發(fā)起對(duì)中國(guó)人民的政治迫害是錯(cuò)誤的;這也會(huì)讓西方對(duì)法律與規(guī)則的堅(jiān)持變得空洞。來(lái)自美國(guó)政治家采取以牙還牙，“互惠”措施的呼吁，可以說(shuō)是公平的自我防衛(wèi)，比如對(duì)學(xué)者和非政府組織工作者采取(與中國(guó))對(duì)等的簽證(政策)。仍然忽視這些(政治)操縱，期望中國(guó)在未來(lái)變得更友善，只會(huì)迎來(lái)變本加厲的行為。與此相反(Instead)，西方需要堅(jiān)守自身的原則。如果可能，就各國(guó)合作;如果必要，就分開(kāi)行動(dòng)。對(duì)西方來(lái)說(shuō)，避開(kāi)修昔底德陷阱的第一步就是要利用自身的價(jià)值觀來(lái)讓中國(guó)的銳實(shí)力變“鈍”。

附原文：

Sharp power

——China is manipulating debate in Western democracies. What can they do about it?

WHEN a risig power challenges an incumbent one, war often follows. That prospect, known as the Thucydides trap after the Greek historian who first described it, looms over relations between China and the West, particularly America. So, increasingly, does a more insidious confrontation. Even if China does not seek to conquer foreign lands, many people fear that it seeks to conquer foreign minds.

Australia was the first to raise a red flag about China’s tactics. On December 5th allegations that China has been interfering in Australian politics, universities and publishing led the government to propose new laws to tackle “unprecedented and increasingly sophisticated” foreign efforts to influence lawmakers . This week an Australian senator resigned over accusations that, as an opposition spokesman, he took money from China and argued its corner. Britain, Canada and New Zealand are also beginning to raise the alarm. On December 10th Germany accused China of trying to groom politicians and bureaucrats. And on December 13th Congress held hearings on China’s growing influence.

This behaviour has a name—“sharp power”, coined by the National Endowment for Democracy, a Washington-based think-tank. “Soft power” harnesses the allure of culture and values to add to a country’s strength; sharp power helps authoritarian regimes coerce and manipulate opinion abroad.

The West needs to respond to China’s behaviour, but it can not simply throw up the barricades. Unlike the old Soviet Un- ion, China is part of the world economy. Instead, in an era when statesmanship is in short supply, the West needs to find a statesmanlike middle ground. That starts with an understanding of sharp power and how it works.

Influencing the influencers

Like many countries, China has long tried to use visas, grants, investments and culture to pursue its interests. But its actions have recently grown more intimidating and encompassing. Its sharp power has a series of interlocking components: subversion, bullying and pressure, which combine to promote self- censorship. For China, the ultimate prize is pre-emptive kowtowing by those whom it has not approached, but who nonetheless fear losing funding, access or influence.

China has a history of spying on its diaspora, but the subversion has spread. In Australia and New Zealand Chinese money is alleged to have bought influence in politics, with party donations or payments to individual politicians. This week’s complaint from German intelligence said that China was using the LinkedIn business network to ensnare politicians and government officials, by having people posing as recruiters and think-tankers and offering free trips.

Bullying has also taken on a new menace. Sometimes the message is blatant, as when China punished Norway economically for awarding a Nobel peace prize to a Chinese pro- democracy activist. More often, as when critics of China are not included in speaker line-ups at conferences, or academics avoid study of topics that China deems sensitive, individual cases seem small and the role of officials is hard to prove. But the effect can be grave. Western professors have been pressed to recant. Foreign researchers may lose access to Chinese archives. Policymakers may find that China experts in their own countries are too ill-informed to help them.

Because China is so integrated into economic, political and cultural life, the West is vulnerable to such pressure. Western governments may value trade over scoring diplomatic points, as when Greece vetoed a European Union statement criticising China’s record on human rights, shortly after a Chinese firm had invested in the port of Piraeus. The economy is so big that businesses often dance to China’s tune without being told to. An Australian publisher suddenly pulled a book, citing fears of “Beijing’s agents of influence”.

What to do?

Facing complaints from Australia and Germany, China has called its critics irresponsible and paranoid—and there is indeed a danger of anti-Chinese hysteria. However, if China were being more truthful, it would point out that its desire for influence is what happens when countries become powerful.

China has a lot more at stake outside its borders today than it did. Some 10m Chinese have moved abroad since 1978. It worries that they will pick up democratic habits from foreigners and infect China itself. Separately, Chinese companies are investing in rich countries, including in resources, strategic infrastructure and farmland. China’s navy can project power far from home. Its government frets that its poor image abroad will do it harm. And as the rising superpower, China has an appetite to shape the rules of global engagement—rules created largely by America and western Europe and routinely invoked by them to justify their own actions.

To ensure China’s rise is peaceful, the West needs to make room for China’s ambition. But that does not mean anything goes. Open societies ignore China’s sharp power at their peril.

Part of their defence should be practical. Counter-intelligence, the law and an independent media are the best protection against subversion. All three need Chinese speakers who grasp the connection between politics and commerce in China.C$h$i$n$e$s$e C$o$m$m$u$n$i$s$t P$a$r$t$y sup$presses fr$ee ex$pression, o$pen de$bate and in$dependent th$ought to ce$ment its control.Part should be principled. Unleashing a witch-hunt against Chinese people would be wrong; it would also make Western claims to stand for the rule of law sound hollow. Calls from American politicians for tit-for-tat “reciprocity”, over visas for academics and NGO workers, say, would be equally self-defeating. Yet ignoring manipulation in the hope that China will be more friendly in the future would only invite the next jab. Instead the West needs to stand by its own principles, with countries acting together if possible, and separately if they must. The first step in avoiding the Thucydides trap is for the West to use its own values to blunt China’s sharp power.